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The law and the economy are deeply influenced by horizontal
property rights, which are the rules regulating legal direct and
indirect takings between private parties. To foster research on the
determinants and impact of these institutions, we illustrate here a
novel data set partially employed in (Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe,
Carmine Guerriero, 2015; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Carmine
Guerriero, Zhenxing Huang, 2016) [3,4], and (Guerriero Carmine,
2016) [6] and describing the acquisition of ownership through
adverse possession of personal and real property and the use of
government takings to transfer real property from a private party
to another private party in 126 jurisdictions. These data are based
on the laws and judicial decisions prevailing in each jurisdiction
between 1981 and 2011.
& 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Specifications Tableubject area Economics.
ore specific
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G. Dari-Mattiacci, C. Guerriero / Data in Brief 11 (2017) 557–561558ow data was
acquired1 This form of expropr
he extant social scienc
2 This is available at hBy extracting from questionnaires drafted by experts the rules on the acquisition of
ownership through adverse possession and on government takings.ata format Raw.
xperimental
factorsThe sample has been selected based on the availability of the contributors.xperimental
featuresProperty rights are measured through indicators grounded on the laws and
judicial decisions prevailing in 126 jurisdictions between 1981 and 2011.ata source
location126 jurisdictions.ata accessibility Data are with this article.Value of the data
 The data can help understand the origins and impact of horizontal property rights.
 Since the private-taking-based measures of property rights we illustrate do not correlate with the
most used predation-based proxies for property rights (see [6]), further research on the links
among horizontal property rights, vertical property rights, and the economy is welcome.
 The data are key to draw policy implications relevant for the current process of international legal
harmonization.1. Data
The data set, which is reported in the “HPR_W” excel file, consists of cross-sectional observations
on thirteen measures of horizontal property rights. These legal rules determine the protection of
private property from private takings. These are omnipresent forms of legal expropriation, and
therefore they are substantially different from predation by the state and powerful elites.12. Experimental design, materials and methods
We constructed each measure as follows [3,4,6]. First, we sent questionnaires to members of the
law firms part of the international networks Lex Mundi and HG.org, participants in the World Bank
doing business project, and legal scholars asking information on horizontal property rights in their
jurisdiction. These contributors, whose names and affiliations are listed in the Internet appendix of
[6],2 based their answers on the laws and judicial decisions prevailing between 1981 and 2011.
Second, we extracted from these answers discrete variables assuming values higher the higher is the
protection afforded to the original owner of personal or real property—i.e., “movable” or “immovable”
goods in civil law parlance, vis-à-vis a good-faith possessor or a good-faith buyer from a dishonest
intermediary. Because there was no relevant reform, the data take the form of a cross section of 126
jurisdictions (see Table 1).
When transaction costs are sizable, private parties are often allowed to take property with or
without paying compensation to the original owner (Bouckaert and De Geest [2]). Two are the main
instances in which this legal private expropriation takes place, a direct one—known as adverse
possession—and an indirect one, i.e., government takings. Next, we illustrate our proxies for each
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Adverse possession is the acquisition of property rights by a possessor by virtue of the passing of
time and recurring other conditions such as continuous, notorious, and open possession. Through
adverse possession then, property can be effectively transferred without the original owner's consent.
2.1.1. Personal property
Different jurisdictions weigh differently the interests of the original owner and the possessor. In
the United States for instance, a good-faith possessor of a movable good cannot acquire ownership of
the good through adverse possession, whereas she/he does so after 10 years in Germany and 3 years
in France. Hence, an original owner is protected increasingly more in France, Germany, and the United
States, and a natural metrics of her/his property rights on a movable good is the number of years after
which a good-faith possessor of the good acquires ownership or thirty, which is the maximum length
of adverse possession in the sample, if she/he cannot acquire property rights, i.e., Adverse-Possession-
M-GF. We develop in a similar way other ten variables assuming higher values the higher is the
relative protection afforded to the original owner vis-à-vis the good-faith possessor/buyer of a
movable good.
The first one is the number of years after which the proprietary remedies of the owner of a
movable good expire, i.e., Remedy-M. A second set of variables refers to the purchase of a stolen
movable good. These indicators gauge indeed the number of years after which the buyer acquires
ownership of a stolen movable purchased within either a private sale, public market, and an auction
or from a professional seller, i.e., respectively Property-Private-Sale-SM, Property-Public-Market-SM,
Property-Auction-SM, and Property-Professional-Seller-SM. A third set of variables deals which the
purchase of a movable good that was embezzled, i.e., withheld by someone to whom it was entrusted
to be held or used for specific purposes. These indicators gauge indeed the number of years after
which the buyer acquires ownership of an embezzled movable purchased within either a private sale,
public market, and an auction or from a professional seller, i.e., respectively Property-Private-Sale-EM,
Property-Public-Market-EM, Property-Auction-EM, and Property-Professional-Seller-EM. Finally, the
dummy Good-Faith-M equals 0 when the good faith is presumed. Clearly, the mere presumption
protects more the buyer.
2.1.2. Real property
The transfer of real property is more complex since it requires registration, which has an asym-
metric impact across jurisdictions depending on the extent of enforceability against third parties
(Bouckaert and De Geest [2]). Accordingly, we focus on the case emphasizing the most the adverse
possessor's claim. To illustrate, we study the conflict between a good-faith possessor without title of
an immovable good and a third party buying the good from the original owner after the term for
adverse possession is expired, and we maintain that the good is registered if this step is necessary to
acquire property via adverse possession. Then, our proxy for horizontal property rights on immovable
Table 2
Summary of Variables.
Variables Definition and sources Summary statistics
Adverse-Possession-M-GF: Time limit for adverse possession of a movable good by any good-faith possessor in years. 11.306 (11.890) [126]
Remedy-M: Number of years after which the proprietary remedies of the owner of a movable good expire. 15.341 (12.538) [126]
Property-Private-Sale-SM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of a stolen movable good
purchased within a private sale.
12.056 (12.765) [126]
Property-Public-Market-SM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of a stolen movable good
purchased within a public market.
10.119 (12.332) [126]
Property-Auction-SM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of a stolen movable good
purchased within an auction sale.
7.968 (11.496) [126]
Property-Professional-Seller-SM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of a stolen movable good
purchased from a professional seller.
9.159 (11.911) [126]
Property-Private-Sale-EM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of an embezzled movable good
purchased within a private sale.
7.782 (11.877) [126]
Property-Public-Market-EM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of an embezzled movable good
purchased within a public market.
6.766 (11.267) [126]
Property-Auction-EM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of an embezzled movable good
purchased within an auction sale.
5.790 (10.506) [126]
Property-Professional-Seller-EM: Number of years after which the good-faith buyer definitively acquires property of an embezzled movable good
purchased from a professional seller.
5.869 (10.475) [126]
Good-faith-M: Dummy equal to 0 when good-faith is presumed and 1 otherwise. 0.238 (0. 428) [126]
Adverse-Possession-I-GF: Number of years necessary for adverse possession of an immovable good with good-faith but without title if the
adverse possessor prevails against a good-faith buyer from the original owner and/or registration is compulsory
for adverse possession; thirty otherwise.
24.573 (8.082) [89]
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possession of an immovable good with good-faith but without title if the adverse possessor prevails
against a good-faith buyer from the original owner and/or registration is compulsory for adverse
possession and thirty otherwise. When the good-faith possessor prevails, the legal protection of the
original owner is weaker.
2.2. Indirect private takings: Government takings
Private takings can also be mediated by the state, which can always, under the power of eminent
domain, seize private real property for ``public interest” and upon paying a “just” compensation [5].
What constitutes public interest however differs among different jurisdictions. With this remark in
mind, we consider the dummy Government-Takings, which equals 1 if the state can take real property
from a private party only for public use. Whenever Government-Takings is instead zero, the state can
use government takings to transfer property from a private party to another for private for-profit use
and so favor a subgroup of the population to the detriment of another.Acknowledgments
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